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Abstract:  
We analyze the complementarity between legal incentives (the threat of being held 
liable for damages) and normatives incentives (the fear of social disapproval or 
stigma) in situations where instances of misbehavior are not perfectly observable. 
There may be multiple equilibria within a given legal regime, as well as multiple 
socio-legal equilibria. In particular, there are high stigma-high evidentiary standard 
regimes versus low stigma-low standard ones. We argue that this may explain some 
of the differences between common law and civil law regarding the notions of fault or 
negligence. Our analysis also provides an explanation for trends currently observed 
in civil-law systems, in particular the weakening of evidentiary requirements in tort 
cases. 
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1 Introduction
Social norms as guide to behavior may both be substitutes and complements
for law. Kaplow and Shavell (2002) observe that there is a strong norm to
avoid injuring others and to compensate them for injuries one does cause.
A similar observation was made by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral
Sentiments. An individual found to have caused harm due to his carelessness
faces not only a legal sanction the damages he must pay the victim but
also social disapproval or stigma, which presumably is by itself a source of
disutility. In preventing accidental harm, social behavioral norms and the
fear of disapproval if one is shown to have misbehaved may therefore provide
incentives to exert care, in addition to legal incentives. Compliance with a
social behavioral norm seems to be relevant in litigation involving medical
malpracice, professional liability or breach of contract.
We analyze the complementarity between legal incentives (the threat of
being held liable for damages) and normative incentives (the fear of social
disapproval or stigma) in situations where instances of misbehavior are not
perfectly observable. Specically, we consider the following set-up:
1. Carelessness causing harm is not directly observable, but putative vic-
tims may le civil actions on the basis of imperfectly informative evi-
dence. Given such evidence, courts rule whether a defendant was care-
less, i.e., at fault or negligent.
2. A judgment of negligence implies the payment of damages to the plain-
ti¤. Since such judgments are made public, they also confer additional
disutility due to disapproval or stigma, given the social norms of be-
havior.
3. The stigma attached to rulings of fault depend on the actual incidence
of misbehavior in the population and on the courtsevidentiary stan-
dard for establishing fault, i.e., on the degree of certainty they require
in the presence of evidentiary uncertainty.
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4. The evidentiary standard is itself endogenous. It reects the trade-o¤
faced by courts between the risk of error in judging the case at hand
and the e¤ect of court decisions on future compliance.
We show that in such a set-up there may be multiple equilibria within
a given legal regime, as well as multiple socio-legal equilibria. In particu-
lar, there may be high stigma-high evidentiary standard regimes versus low
stigma-low standard ones. Moreover, we show that small societal changes
in the relevance of stigma may trigger important adaptative changes in the
legal regime. These are shown to reinforce the exogenous change in the sig-
nicance of stigma, through a form of socio-legal multiplier. We argue that
this may explain some of the di¤erences between common law and civil law
regimes regarding the notions of fault or negligence. We also argue that our
analysis may provide an explanation for trends currently observed in civil
law systems, in particular the weakening of standard of proof requirements
in tort cases.
If there is a stigma associated with an adverse court judgement, the extent
of the stigma presumably depends on the weight of evidence required by
courts. Indeed, in a system where the defendant can be found negligent on
the basis of relatively weak evidence, the stigma should be smaller than if
very strong evidence is needed because the risk of mistakenly condemning
the innocent is greater.
For civil litigation, it is well known that common law regimes require
much weaker evidence for nding fault than civil-law countries. In England
and the United States, the standard of proof is probabilistic: a plainti¤
need ordinarily prove his claim only by a preponderance of the evidence.
By contrast, as noted by Clermont and Sherwin (2002), civil-law regimes
require a higher degree of proof, although the judge may and must always
content himself with a degree of certainty that is appropriate for practical
life (Kaplan and Schaefer, 1958). The stigma associated with an adverse
judgment should therefore be smaller in common law system.
As the fear of stigma generates incentives, this raises the issue whether
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common law regimes induce lower compliance? We show that this does not
follow because evidentiary standards also have incentives e¤ects. Indeed, we
show that similar compliance levels can be reached through di¤erent means,
i.e. low evidentiary standard - low stigma versus high evidentiary standard
- high stigma.
One may ask why evidentiary standards di¤er between legal regimes. On
the one hand, it may be that di¤erent legal systems seek di¤erent objec-
tives. For instance they trade-o¤ di¤erently considerations of deterrence and
of judicial error. On the other hand, it may also be that legal systems share
identical objectives but that the societies in which they operate are very dif-
ferent. Evidentiary standards reect the trade-o¤s faced by the legal system.
The terms of this trade-o¤ may be very di¤erent between societies, yielding
di¤erent evidentiary standards.
In this paper, we explore a variant of the second explanation. We show
that legal systems may in fact diverge substantially even though societies dif-
fer only slightly. The intuition is that societal di¤erences have self-reinforcing
e¤ects. Small societal shocks that reduce the importance of stigmas (e.g.,
greater individualism or greater anonymity) tend to reduce compliance. How-
ever, lower overall compliance inuences the courts priors about the defen-
dants behavior. Moreover, lower stigma means that the penalty erroneously
imposed on the innocent defendant is smaller. The consequence is that, for
a given set of evidence, courts will be less reluctant to declare a defendant
negligent. In turn, this stabilizes compliance but tends to lower further the
stigma associated with an adverse judgement. Altogether, adaptative changes
in the legal system therefore have a stabilizing e¤ect on compliance but a
destabilizing e¤ect on stigma.
The paper develops as follows. Section 2 discusses how our paper relates
to the literature on stigma and social interactions. Section 3 presents the
model. Section 4 derives the comparative statics when the legal regime is
held xed. In section 5, the legal regime is made endogenous, leading to
the concepts of socio-legal equilibria and socio-legal multipliers. Section 6
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concludes. Proofs of propositions are in the appendix unless statements are
obvious from the text.
2 Literature
The relation between legal rules and social norms has been addressed only
recently in the law and economics literature. To quote McAdams and Ras-
musen (2005), Law seeks to regulate behavior when self-interest does not
produce the correct results as measured by e¢ ciency or fairness. If people
behave well without regulation, law is superuous and merely creates extra
costs. And if law is not what actually determines human behavior, scholars
debating it are wasting their time. Law becomes relevant when social norms
or other forms of social control fail. For this reason, law matters primarily
to the bad manof Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1897)... For the man who
is not badin this sense, however, there are other important inuences on
his behavior. Whether the inuence is described as morality or norms, the
law does not fully determine the behavior of the remainder of society that is
not bad. The economic analysis of law should therefore be interested in the
power of normative incentives, whether these take the form of guilt, pride,
esteem or disapproval.
Cooter and Porat (2001) analyzed the interaction between social norms
and legal decisions from a social cost perspective. They consider a liability
case where, say, the defendants negligence caused a loss of 10000 euros to the
plainti¤without harming anyone else. Suppose the court holds the defendant
liable for 10000 euros but that, upon learning of the courts decision, citi-
zens boycott the defendants business and cause a loss of 2500 euros. Courts
largely ignore this kind of interaction between their decisions and nonlegal
sanctions. Cooter and Porat remark that the contrast between formal state
law and informal social norms could help to explain the relative advantages
or disadvantages of law and morality as a means of social control. They ar-
gue that courts should take nonlegal sanctions into account because deducing
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nonlegal sanctions (from damages awarded to victims) would contribute to
the reduction of social costs by improving the incentives of both wrongdoers
and potential victims1.
Normative incentives through the fear of stigmas represent a special case.
Stigmas refer to the external incentives due to the reluctance of individuals
to interact with persons who breach social norms (Rasmusen, 1996). What
is important for our purpose is that stigma frequently follows legal sanctions.
This is obviously the case for criminal convictions, particularly in jurisdic-
tions in which ones criminal record is made public. Indeed, some criminal
law experts have suggested that the stigma e¤ect of sentencing should be in-
creased (Massaro, 1997). Shaming penalties  penalties whose e¤ectiveness
hinges largely on stigma  have recently become popular in many American
jurisdictions. Klement and Harel (2006), however, point out some limitations
to the usefulness of stigma as a tool in crime prevention. They argue that
the extensive use of stigma as a substitute for traditional sanctions, e.g., in
the context of shaming penalties, may undermine its deterrent e¤ects. In
their analysis, the e¤ectiveness of stigma is inversely related to the rate of
crime detection. As more crimes are detected, the stigma from a conviction
decreases, implying a smaller deterrent e¤ect.
The discussion about stigmas also bears a relation to the so-called ex-
pressive theory of law. According to this theory, laws have a norm-activation
power in the sense that they a¤ect behavior not only by shaping the material
payo¤s, but also by directly inuencing peoples motives (Cooter, 1998). As
law expresses values, it can change individual beliefs and coordinate actions
into new equilibria. Tyran and Feld (2006) and Galbiati and Vertova (2007)
discuss experiments on the behavioral e¤ects of legal rules dened as oblig-
ations backed by incentives. The results show that rules a¤ect both beliefs
about othersbehavior and peoples preference for cooperation.
Our paper is also related to the literature on social interactions, which
1However, the amount of the appropriate deduction is unknown because there is little
knolwledge of the extent of nonlegal sanctions.
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constitute a particular form of externality. In this approach, the actions
of a reference group directly a¤ect an individuals preferences (Scheinkman,
2006). The reference group depends on the context and is typically an in-
dividuals family, neighbors, friends or peers. Social interactions are some-
times called non-market to emphasize that they are not regulated by the
price mechanism. They seem particularly apt to solve a pervasive problem in
the social sciences, namely the observation of large di¤erences in outcomes in
the absence of commensurate di¤erences in fundamentals. Due to strategic
complementarity (ones marginal utility of undertaking an action is increas-
ing in the average action of ones peers), actions change not only because of
the change in fundamentals, but also because of the change in the behavior
of others, leading to a social multiplier e¤ect.
As a result, there may be large variations in endogenous variables relative
to the variation in fundamentals, which seems characteristic of phenomena as
diverse as stock market crashes, religious di¤erences, or di¤erences in crime
rates. Moreover, multiple equilibria can occur, i.e., di¤erent outcomes are
consistent with the same fundamentals. For instance, Glaeser, Sacerdote and
Scheinkman (1996) observe that crime rates across large American cities di¤er
too much to be explained by the usual socioeconomic variables. They develop
a model connecting the structure of social interactions among individuals
with the variation of aggregate behavior across space, providing a framework
for investigating the importance of social interactions. Our paper proposes
to capture a similar phenomenon in the eld of civil law. The intuition is
that the interaction between legal regimes and stigma may yield di¤erent
socio-legal equilibria.
Our paper also shares some features with Bénabou and Tirole (2006).
In that paper, individuals are concerned with social esteem, based on how
others view their true type. Observable actions inuence the beliefs of
others and therefore play a social signaling role. In our set-up, social esteem
depends on an individuals behavior, rather than his type, and actions are
not directly observable. However, court judgments have a signaling role and
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therefore a¤ect social esteem.
3 The model
Individuals choose between two actions or types of behavior. The action n
is the social norm while h is socially undesirable. In the present context, h
refers to careless behavior imposing harm on others. Although carelessness is
not legally a crime, it may constitute the basis for a civil suit if harm can be
proved in court. In addition to the risk of legal sanction, carelessness is also
met with social disapproval or stigma, which by itself is a source of disutility
for the individual found to have behaved carelessly. Thus, n is both a social
norm of behavior and the legal due care standard.
For simplicity, the occurrence of harm due to carelessness is non sto-
chastic. An individuals behavior j 2 fn; hg, equivalently the occurrence of
harm, is not directly veriable but it generates evidence that may be brought
in court. Evidence about ones behavior is summarized by a signal x with
cumulative distributions Fj(x) and corresponding density functions fj(x).
Assumption 1: The support of fh(x) and fn(x) is [x; x], fh(x)=fn(x) is
strictly increasing over the support and fh(x)=fn(x) = 1.
The condition that the densities have the same support means that ev-
idence never perfectly reveals behavior or harm. The monotone likelihood
ratio property (MLRP), with the convention that fh(x)=fn(x) is strictly in-
creasing, implies that large values of x represent unfavorableevidence as
to whether behavior was appropriate. The assumption that the likelihood
ratio tends to innity at the upper bound of the support ensures an interior
solution in the optimization problem of section 5. It also means that some
realizations of the evidence may be very convincingthat the defendant was
indeed negligent (e.g., he may be innitely more likely to have taken action
h).
An individual believing he has su¤ered harm due to someones careless-
ness may le suit and submit the evidence x. Courts use a threshold bx to
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assess whether harm due to carelessness occurred. When presented with the
evidence x > bx, they rule that the defendant was negligent and caused harm,
in which case he is held liable for damages. The threshold bx is the courtsev-
identiary standard, i.e., the weight of evidence needed for a judgment against
the defendant. A higher bx means a more demanding standard.
Because evidence is imperfect, there is a probability Fh(bx) that an indi-
vidual who has actually misbehaved will escape liability. Similarly, there is
a probability 1   Fn(bx) that an individual who has conformed to the social
norm will nevertheless be sued and found to have misbehaved. For instance,
the plainti¤ may have su¤ered harm that is not due to the defendants care-
lessness, but it is not always possible to identify such situations. Accordingly,
an individual is sued and loses his case if the evidence satises x > bx, he is
not sued if x  bx (alternatively, he could be sued but would win anyway).
Carelessness procures a private benet b distributed according to the
cumulative distribution G(b). Equivalently, b is the opportunity cost of con-
forming to the social norm. We assume that b is less than the harm imposed
by h, which means that h is always socially undesirable. Indeed, some in-
dividuals may be altruisticin the sense that they have a negative b: they
derive utility from not causing harm to others (or would su¤er guilt from
harming others). An individual knows b before deciding between n and h.
The disutility from being found liable includes the damages l paid to the
successful plainti¤ and the stigma s from social disapproval.
An individual with benet b from misbehaving conforms to the behavioral
norm if
b  (1  Fh(bx)) (l + s)    (1  Fn(bx)) (l + s);
that is, if
b  (Fn(bx)  Fh(bx)) (l + s); (1)
The inequality states that the benet from action h is less than the expected
disutility due to the increase in the risk of an unfavorable court judgment.
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The expression
(bx)  Fn(bx)  Fh(bx); (2)
which we refer to as detection, is the di¤erence in the probability of being de-
clared negligent when one undertakes h rather than n.2 Detection is positive
since MLRP implies Fn(bx) > Fh(bx) for any bx 2 (x; x). However, detection is
also less than unity because evidence is imperfect.
Compliance is dened as the fraction of the population conforming to
the social norm. Combining (1) and the distribution of the private benet,
compliance is
y = G [(bx)(l + s)] : (3)
For our purpose, the situations considered must be such that compliance,
although suboptimal (i.e. y < 1); is not too small. This makes sense in
the context of a social behavioral norm which most people are expected to
conform to. We make this explicit through the following assumption:
Assumption 2: G(0) > 1
2
.
This condition is satised, irrespective of stigma and of legal sanction, if
intrinsic motivations induce a majority of the population to comply, i.e.,
there is a majority of individuals with a negative benet b.
With respect to suboptimality, observe that compliance is non decreasing
in detection and in legal and normative sanctions. In the absence of stigma,
undercompliance is consistent with compensatory damages because detection
is imperfect. The stigma must not be large enough to compensate for imper-
fect detection. It may also be that legal damages are less than compensatory,
as is often the case for nonpecuniary harm, thus aggravating suboptimality.
In any case, detection and legal or normative damages are assumed to be
such that (3) is always less than unity.
2To emphasize, detection refers here to the probability of being found negligent as
seen by the individual who chooses between the actions n and h.
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Figure 1: Judicial errrors
Judicial errors
Penalizing the innocentwill be referred to as the type I error, not penalizing
the culpableas the type II. The probability of a type I error is 1  Fn(bx);
that of a type II is Fh(bx). There is obviously a trade-o¤ between the two:
a higher evidentiary standard (a larger bx) increases the type II error but
reduces the type I. The convex curve in gure 1 describes this relationship.
The marginal rate of substitution between type II and type I error is
  dFh(bx)
d(1  Fn(bx)) = fh(bx)fn(bx) ;
the likelihood ratio of h versus n at the threshold bx. ByMLRP, The likelihood
ratio increases with bx. Hence it is larger as the type II error gets larger,
implying that the curve in gure 1 is convex with respect to the origin.
Both errors are equal when the curve cuts the forty-ve degree line. Above
this line, evidentiary standards are such that the type I error is smaller than
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the type II. What critical likelihood ratios fh(bx)
fn(bx) do such standards require?
We assume the following:
Assumption 3: If fh(bx)
fn(bx)  1; then 1  Fn(bx)  Fh(bx):
The intuition is as follows. A defendant is found negligent only if x > bx;
equivalently if fh(x)=fn(x) > fh(bx)=fn(bx). When the evidentiary standard
satises fh(bx)=fn(bx)  1, a defendant can therefore be found to be at fault
only if negligence is more likely than due care. The assumption states that the
type I error should then not be larger than the type II. The interpretation
is that the potential evidence is not skewed against the innocent. If the
assumption did not hold, a type I error smaller than a type II would require
that negligence be found only if it is su¢ ciently more likely than due care.
In gure 1, the evidentiary standard satisfying fh(bx)=fn(bx) = 1 is denotedbxM . At this point, the slope of the trade-o¤ curve (in absolute value) equals
unity.
Compliance
Before proceeding, we analyze how compliance with the social norm varies
with the stigma and the evidentiary standard. Denote by y(s; bx) the com-
pliance function dened in (3). Clearly, it is increasing in s. The e¤ect of a
change in the evidentiary standard is given by
@y(s; bx)
@bx = G0  (l + s)0(bx):
The sign depends on whether detection increases or decreases with a strength-
ening of the standard.
>From (2), it is immediate that (x) = (x) = 0, hence detection is
maximized at some bxM 2 (x; x). Now,
0(bx) = fn(bx)  fh(bx) = fn(bx)  1  fh(bx)
fn(bx)

;
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yielding our rst result, which follows directly from MLRP.
Proposition 1: The detection maximizing evidentiary standard is bxM sat-
isfying fh(bxM)=fn(bxM) = 1. 0(bx) is positive for bx < bxM and negative forbx > bxM .
Thus, y(s; bx) is increasing in the rst argument. It may be increasing
or decreasing in the second, depending on whether the evidentiary standard
is higher or lower than bxM . Observe that any standard bx  bxM requires
that negligence be more likely than due care for a judgement against the
defendant.
Corollary 1: For a standard bx  bxM the proportion of individuals not
found liable is
yFn(bx) + (1  y)Fh(bx) > 1
2
:
Assumption 2 ensures that compliance y is greater than one half. Com-
bining this with assumption 3 yields the result. If the evidentiary standard
satises the above condition, the average individualin society escapes lia-
bility. In other words, being found negligent is an unusual event.
Stigma
Society at large does not observe the behavior of any particular individual,
but whether someone has been sued for faulty behavior and the outcome of
the trial is public information. We assume that most people are not cognizant
of the detailed evidence discussed in any particular trial. Thus, suits and
trial outcomes act as signals about individual behavior. They constitute an
imperfect screening device for sorting societys members between those who
conform to the social norm and those who do not.
The stigma associated with an adverse judgment depends on the extent
of compliance and on the evidentiary requirement for proving negligence, i.e.,
s = s(y; bx). Following Schelling (1978), the social interaction literature has
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emphasized strategic complementarities. The greater the fraction of the pop-
ulation that behaves, the greater the disutility from being seen to misbehave.
Let '(y), an increasing function, be the utility or social consideration
earned by someone who is known for sure to conform to the social norm. If
courts never erred or if individuals were naive and disregarded the possibility
of judicial error, the stigma from an adverse judgment would then simply be
the loss of '(y).
However, individuals recognizing the risk of court error will factor in the
information content of an adverse judgment. Using Bayes theorem, the
posterior probability that an individual conformed to the behavioral norm,
conditional on not being sued (equivalently on being sued but winning the
case), is
p0(y; bx) = yFn(bx)
yFn(bx) + (1  y)Fh(bx) :
Conditional on an adverse judgment, the probability that the defendant in
fact conformed to the norm is
p1(y; bx) = y(1  Fn(bx))
y(1  Fn(bx)) + (1  y)(1  Fh(bx)) :
The information content of the signals provided by the legal system can
therefore be expressed as
q(y; bx) = p0(y; bx)  p1(y; bx);
i.e., the di¤erence across goodand badoutcomes in the up-dated prob-
ability of appropriate behavior.
The stigma attached to an unfavorable trial outcome is
s(y; bx) = q(y; bx)'(y): (4)
To see this, suppose that courts never err, i.e., Fn(bx) = 1 and Fh(bx) = 0; then
q(y; bx) = 1 and the stigma reduces to '(y). Conversely, if trial outcomes are
uninformative, i.e., Fn(bx) = Fh(bx), then q(y; bx) = 0 and the stigma attached
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to an adverse outcome is nil. Abstracting from these extreme cases, the
stigma from an adverse outcome should therefore lie between zero and '(y).
According to (4), the stigma is the di¤erence in expected social esteem
across good and bad outcomes. If trials were not available, an individual
taken at random would be credited with the average social esteem y'(y).
When trials exist, and assuming for the sake of the argument that this does
not modify y, individuals sort themselves between winnerswith social es-
teem p0(y; bx)'(y) and loserswith social esteem p1(y; bx)'(y). The di¤er-
ential loss of status between the two is the stigma as dened in (4). This is
consistent with the use of s in the incentive condition (1), where the stigma
is the di¤erence between the status of an individual found negligent and one
who has not been found negligent.
We now discuss how y and bx a¤ect the stigma. By assumption, '(y) is
increasing, so we need only discuss q(y; bx).
Proposition 2: q(y; bx) is strictly concave in y with q(0; bx) = q(1; bx) = 0.
When 0 < y < 1, q(y; bx) is increasing in bx for bx  bxM .
The function q(y; bx) is easily seen to be increasing in y for small values
and decreasing for su¢ ciently large values. The reason is that the impact
of a trial outcome on posteriorbeliefs is smallest when priorsare more
precise, which is the case when y is close to either zero or unity.
To see why q is increasing in bx; at least over a certain range, consider its
value for arbitrarily high or low evidentiary standards. When the standard is
very high, not being found negligent is relatively uninformative, so winners
earn approximately the priorsocial esteem y'(y). By contrast, being found
negligent is very informative, so losers get zero esteem. Accordingly, the
stigma from an adverse judgment is then y'(y).
Conversely, under an arbitrarily low evidentiary standard, nearly every
one is found negligent. An adverse judgement then provides little information,
so that losers earn approximatively y'(y): On the other hand, winners may
get up to the full '(y): Hence, the stigma may be as high as (1   y)'(y):
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This is smaller than the stigma under an arbitrarily high standard, provided
y > 1
2
. It follows that, under assumption 2, the function q(s; bx) is globally
increasing in bx. From corollary 1, a majority of individuals escapes liability
when bx  bxM : In turn, this can be shown to ensure that q(y; bx) is locally
increasing in the evidentiary standard for bx  bxM .
Summing up, the stigma s(y; bx) = q(y; bx)'(y) is presumablyincreasing
in y, although we must allow for the possibility of a negative e¤ect. Greater
compliance increases the stigma associated with a sure deviation from the so-
cial norm of behavior, but it may decrease the information value of an adverse
court judgment when compliance is already su¢ ciently large. Regarding the
e¤ect of the evidentiary standard, s(y; bx) is unambiguously increasing if the
standard is above bxM .
In the next section we analyze the equilibrium values of y and s, taking
the evidentiary standard as given but assuming it satises bx  bxM .
4 Comparative legal regimes
One obvious reason for considering exogenously given evidentiary standards
is that real legal systems di¤er. It is generally the case in a civil suit that the
plainti¤ bears the burden of proof, i.e. he has to proof the merit of her claim.
As noted in the introduction, the weight of evidence required by the court
varies di¤ers between legal system. In Common Law, this is captured by a
standard of proof requirement. The default standard in a civil suit is the so-
called preponderance of proof: the plainti¤must demonstrate that her claim
is more likely true than false, which is generally interpreted as a fty percent
threshold. By contrast, strictly speaking, the concept of standard of proof
does not exist in civil-law regimes. Nevertheless, the implicitstandard is
known to require a higher degree of certainty, often captured by notions such
as intime conviction. The consequence is that the claimant winning a suit
under common law could well have lost it under a civil-law regime.
In the present section, we discuss the e¤ects of di¤erent evidentiary stan-
15
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Figure 2: Single equilibrium
dards for compliance and the stigmas associated with a nding of negligence.
Equilibria under a given evidentiary standard
For a given threshold bx, an equilibrium is a pair of y and s solving
y = y(s; bx); (5)
s = s(y; bx): (6)
Examples of the corresponding curves are represented in the gures 2 to
4. In gure 2, the intercept ya of the curve y(s; bx) is the level of compliance
that would arise in the absence of stigma. The intercept yb for curve s(y; bx)
is the level of compliance below which there is no stigma from an adverse
court judgment. Accordingly, the s(y; bx) curve also includes the portion on
the vertical axis below yb. In gure 2 the equilibrium is at E.
In gure 3, there are two points of intersection, E and D. However,
we discard D since it corresponds to an unstable equilibrium. In a stable
equilibrium, as with point E in gure 2, the s curve cuts the y curve from
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below, that is,
@y(s; bx; )
@s
>

@s(y; bx; )
@y
 1
or 1  yssy > 0;
where ys and sy are short-hand for the respective partial derivatives3. The
equilibrium in gure 3 (at point E) illustrates a situation of low compliance
where the stigma from an adverse judgement is nil.
Figure 4 illustrates the case of multiple equilibria, a well known possibility
in social interaction models. The S-shaped curve for the stigma function
may be explained by a similar form for the full information stigma '(y).
The stigma starts to build up only once a critical level of compliance has
been reached, but the rate of increase levels down when su¢ ciently large
compliance level is reached. This may be compounded by how q(y; bx) varies
with y, as discussed in the last section. The two stable equilibria are E1 and
E2.
Figure 5 makes the point that countries with di¤erent legal regimes may
exhibit similar compliance levels. Suppose two legal regimes A and B with
evidentiary standards bxB > bxA > bxM : >From proposition 1, if the stigma
from an adverse judgment were the same in both cases, society A would have
higher compliance  the curve y(s; bxA) is above the curve y(s; bxB). However,
from proposition 2 and every thing else equal, the stigma in society B should
be higher than in A  the curve s(y; bxA) is below the curve s(y; bxB). As
depicted in the gure, compliance in both societies is roughly the same. Case
A corresponds to a low evidentiary standard - low stigma socio-legal regime,
case B to a high evidentiary standard - high stigma one.
One can interpret this result from a comparative legal systems perspec-
tive. If we consider that the second case is representative of civil law countries
and the rst of common law countries, the comparison tells us that one system
3Suppose y di¤ers initially from the value corresponding to point E in gure 2a and
suppose s and y adapt to one another with a small lag. Then the system would converge
to E.
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Figure 5: Compliance and stigma under di¤erent legal regimes
need not be superior to the other with respect to deterrence. Both systems
may constitute two di¤erent ways of regulating social behavior through the
interactions between social norms and formal rules.
Exogenous societal shocks
In the next section, we will argue that societies may end up with apparently
divergent legal regimes as a result of small exogenous shocks. As a prelim-
inary step, we briey discuss how compliance and stigma are a¤ected by
autonomous changes in the societal set-up when the legal regime is taken as
given. Consider an exogenous drop in the stigma associated with misbehav-
ior. This may reect less concern for social esteem or a more individualistic
and anonymous society. We capture this by the shift factor  in the stigma
function, which we now write as s(y; bx; ) = q(y; bx)'(y; ) where by conven-
tion '(y; ) is increasing in .
Substituting in (5) and (6), the comparative statics with respect to the
shift parameter exhibits the standard social multiplier e¤ect if the stigma
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Figure 6: Low-compliance low-stigma versus high-compliance high stigma
equilibria
increases with compliance:
ds
d
=
s
1  yssy and
dy
d
=
yss
1  yssy ;
where 1=(1 yssy) is the social multiplier, this being greater than unity when
sy > 0.
If there are multiple equilibria, small societal changes may lead to a dras-
tic change in the equilibrium. One such possibility is illustrated in gure 6.
Assume the initial equilibrium is at E under curve s(y; bx; ). An exogenous
drop in stigma shifts the curve up to s(y; bx; 0), with the equilibrium now at
E 0. Starting from a high-compliance high-stigma equilibrium, society now
jumps to a low-compliance low-stigma one.
Both the social multiplier and multiple equilibria require the stigma func-
tion s(y; bx; ) to be increasing in y. In what follows, we show that an en-
dogenous evidentiary standard introduces additional possibilities because of
adaptative legal changes. These may attenuate changes on some dimensions
and reinforce them on others, through a form of legal multiplier.
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5 Endogenous legal systems
As already noted, standards of proof di¤er between legal systems,. However,
all systems share similar concerns. First, they dislike judicial error. Secondly,
they tend to particularly dislike type I errors (penalizing the innocent) when
the consequences for the defendant are particularly severe. This is clearly
demonstrated by numerous legal and political commentators, as well as in
the works of authors as varied as Shakespeare, Voltaire, Condorcet or Toc-
queville. Finally, legal systems also understand that evidentiary standards
a¤ect compliance and that deterrence is one of the purposes of law.
When judging a particular case, courts must deal with the risks of error
for the case at hand. How they deal with the case may set an example or
even jurisprudence, with consequences for future compliance. Accordingly,
we model court behavior and jurisprudence as partly adaptative and partly
forward looking.
In assessing the risks of type I and II error for the case before them and the
consequences for the defendant, courts are not engaged in social engineering
but take societys parametersas given. In the present context, the relevant
parameters are the extent of compliance y and the severity of the normative
penalty s that would be imposed on the defendant. The normative penalty is
a net social loss, by contrast with legal damages which constitute a transfer,
hence the courts reluctance in imposing such a loss. In trading o¤ these
concerns, courts are adaptative in the sense that y and s are taken as given.4
However, courts are also forward looking to the extent that they care
about future compliance. We assume they can only do so in a crude way,
which is captured by a concern for (bx), interpreted here as the future detec-
tion level as a function of the evidentiary standard for the case at hand. By
setting bx in the case before them, courts understand that they are thereby
signaling that a similar bx may hold in the future. Individuals will come
to anticipate (bx) as the detection power of judicial proceedings and the bx
4They also take as given the legal damages l, which remains exogenous in our analysis.
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chosen for the case at hand may inuence how future courts will decide.
Evidentiary standard
The legal system reects a societys values and characteristics. We summarize
the trading-o¤ of issues by assuming that the legal system, taking y and s
as given, sets bx so as to maximize
W (bx; y; s) = (bx)   [y (1  Fn(bx)) + (1  y)Fh(bx)]  y (1  Fn(bx)) s:
All else equal, the legal system prefers more detection to less since it induces
a greater compliance. The second term is the loss ascribed to judicial error
in the case at hand. The parameter   0 is the weight given to this concern
and the expression in brackets is the expected probability of type I and II
errors, given the extent of compliance in society. The third term, with weight
  0, is the loss ascribed to the imposition of the stigma s on an innocent
defendant. A positive  amounts to increasing the relative weight ascribed
to a type I error. Courts are assumed not to care about the stigma su¤ered
by a culpable defendant.5
At an interior solution, the evidentiary standard bx = bx(y; s) satises the
rst-order condition
@W
@bx = fn(bx)  fh(bx) +  [yfn(bx)  (1  y)fh(bx)] + yfn(bx)s = 0
or equivalently
fh(bx)
fn(bx) = 1 + (+ s)y1 + (1  y) : (7)
To see the implications, suppose rst that the legal system cares only
about future detection, i.e.,  and  are zero. Then the right-hand side
equals unity as in proposition 1 and therefore bx = bxM . Suppose, by contrast,
that courts seek only to minimize the probability of judicial error, i.e.,  is
5See Demougin and Fluet (2005) for a related formulation of the legal systems objective
function.
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arbitrarily large. Then
fh(bx)
fn(bx) = y1  y
Since a majority of the population conforms to the social norm, the right-
hand side is greater than unity and therefore bx > bxM . A positive  also
pushes the standard above bxM . Moreover, assumption 1 ensures that a so-
lution to (7) exists and that the second-order condition for the optimization
problem is satised.6
Proposition 3: If  or  is positive, bx(y; s) > bxM and is increasing in y.
If  is positive, bx(y; s) is also increasing in s.
The result follows directly from the above discussion. The greater the
extent of compliance in society, the greater the weight of evidence required
by courts to rule that the defendant was negligent. When courts dislike
imposing a net social cost on innocent defendants, bx(y; s) is also increasing
in s. The greater the stigma attached to a ruling of negligence, the more are
courts reluctant to rule against the defendant.
Socio-legal multipliers
As in section 4, the level of compliance y and the stigma s are endogenous
variables given the legal regime and the characteristics of society. From the
above dicussion we now have that the legal regime, as captured by the evi-
dentiary standard bx, is also itself endogenous. The socio-legal equilibrium is
now a solution to the equation system
y = y(s; bx);
s = s(y; bx);bx = bx(y; s):
Obviously, di¤erent societies will exhibit di¤erent equilibria. In particular,
6Given MLRP, the objective function is strictly quasi-concave in bx.
23
if societies di¤er only through the objective function characterizing their legal
systems, then di¤erent evidentiary standards would be observed such as bxA
and bxB in the foregoing section. Compliance would not necessarily diverge
but stigmas would. In what follows, we argue that small di¤erences in the
stigma function can also yield the same consequences given the fact that legal
systems are endogenous.7
To capture the e¤ect of a small di¤erence between societies, we introduce
as in section 4 a shift factor in the stigma function s(y; bx; ). Again, there
may be multiple solutions and we discard unstable equilibria. A necessary
condition for stability is8
 

1  ys  ybx
 sy 1  sbx
 bxy  bxs 1
 > 0:
The comparative statics of an exogenous increase in the stigma function
is
dy
d
=
(ys + ybxbxs)s

;
ds
d
=
(1  ybxbxy)s

> 0; (8)
dbx
d
=
(bxs + bxyys)s

> 0:
>From proposition 1, ybx < 0 because bx > bxM in any equilibrium. Since at
least one of bxy or bxs is positive, the e¤ect of a change in the stigma function
on the equilibrium s and bx has an unambiguous sign. By contrast, the
e¤ect on compliance can go either way: a larger stigma increases compliance,
but it also leads to a more demanding evidentiary standard, which reduces
7We disregard the case where the legal system values only compliance, otherwise the
equilibria are the same as in section 4 but with bx = bxM .
8The so-called Routh-Hurwitz necessary and su¢ cient conditions (see, e.g., Gandolfo,
1971) are  > 0 and 3 (3  ybxbxy   sbxbxs   syys) > . The interpretation of stability is
the same as in footnote 3.
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compliance. If the direct e¤ect dominates, a positive shock on the stigma
function increases compliance.
The issue we address is whether a small exogenous societal shocks may
lead legal systems to diverge, although societies remain apparently similar. If
this is indeed the case, that would suggest that an endogenous legal system
has a stabilizing e¤ect on society, compared to the case where the legal system
does not adapt to societal changes. In other words, it is the legal system that
bears the e¤ect of the shock.
We say that the legal system is stabilizing if endogeneity of the system
dampens the impact of shocks on societal variables. To formalize this in-
tuition, start with an equilibrium (y0; s0; bx0) and suppose the legal system
is held xed at bx0. As in section 4, the e¤ects on y and s of an exogenous
increase in stigma are then9
dy
d
bx=bx0 = yss1  yssy > 0;
ds
d
bx=bx0 = s1  yssy > 0:
The legal system is stabilizing with respect to a societal variable if the above
partial e¤ect is larger than the total e¤ect in (8), where account is taken of
the adaptative changes in the legal system.
Proposition 4: For exogenous changes in the social stigma, the legal system
is stabilizing with respect to y if ybx+ yssbx < 0, it is destabilizing with respect
to s if sbx + syybx > 0.
Recall from section 4 that sbx is positive (given that bx > bxM) while the
sign of sy is ambiguous. It follows that the conditions in proposition 4 are not
necessarily satised because the terms may be of opposite signs. However,
the conditions hold if direct e¤ects dominate. The rst condition is the e¤ect
on compliance of an increase in the evidentiary standard, both the direct
9We assume as before that 1  yssy > 0
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e¤ect and an indirect one through the impact of the standard on the stigma.
The second condition is the e¤ect of the evidentiary standard on the stigma
associated with adverse judgments, again a direct e¤ect and an indirect one
through the impact of the standard on compliance.10
For instance, suppose the above conditions hold and consider a negative
shock on , recalling that s(y; bx; ) = q(y; bx)'(y; ). Before the legal system
adapts, the shock reduces compliance y and the stigma s. Moreover these
changes may be large due to the social multiplier e¤ect. Faced with a smaller
y and a smaller s, the legal system adapts through a less demanding eviden-
tiary standard, i.e., bx is lowered towards bxM . This increases incentives to
conform, therefore stabilizing compliance, but it also reinforces the decrease
in stigma. The latter in turn pushes the legal system to a still lower evi-
dentiary standard. Thus, with respect to stigma, the socio-legal multiplier
is larger than the crude social multiplier computed with an exogenous legal
system.
Multiple equilibria and jumps in legal systems
Normative penalties and legal incentives are complementary in inducing com-
pliance. However, the foregoing discussion shows that adaptative changes in
the legal system may substitute one set of incentives against the other. More-
over, the possibility of multiple equilibria suggests that changes in the socio-
legal equilibrium can be abrupt. Section 4 discussed jumps in the social equi-
librium from a high compliance-high stigma situation to a low compliance-low
stigma one, taking the legal regime as given. In the same section, we also
showed that similar levels of compliance could be achieved under apparently
very di¤erent legal systems. We now demonstrate that when legal systems
are endogenous large di¤erences between legal systems may result from small
societal shocks.
Figure 7 illustrates this possibility. The initial equilibrium is at E0 under
10Note that the conditions necessarily holds if sy is negative.
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Figure 7: Jumps in legal regimes
the legal regime bx0. A small exogenous drop in the relevance of stigma pushes
the stigma curve upwards, as shown by the dotted curve (where 0 < ). If the
legal system remained xed, the equilibrium would jump to the low stigma-
low compliance situation E 0 (this e¤ect is the same as in gure 6). However,
the legal system adapts by reducing the evidentiary standard, which shifts
both the compliance and stigma curves upwards. If the evidentiary standard
has a su¢ ciently strong e¤ect on stigma, the nal equilibrium will be at E1
characterized by the legal regime bx1 < bx0. Compliance does not di¤er much
from the initial equilibrium, but the small exogenous shock to the stigma
function will have triggered an important change in the legal regime. At the
new equilibrium, normative penalties play a much reduced role in inducing
compliance, legal incentives a much larger one.
6 Concluding remarks
The thrust of this paper was to analyze how legal systems respond to small
societal shocks concerning the relevance of stigma avoidance as a regulator
of behavior. We showed that adaptative changes may lead to substantially
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divergent legal systems. Moreover, such changes may substitute formal legal
incentives for informal normative incentives.
There is now a large literature on the crowding out of intrinsic moti-
vationby extrinsic incentives (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2001, and for a sur-
vey Frey and Jegen, 2001). Bénabou and Tirole (2006) develop a theory of
prosocial behaviorwhere social esteem depends on the perception of ones
type. Formal rewards or punishments create doubt about the true motive for
which prosocial actions are undertaken. Crowding out arises following the
introduction of formal incentives because actions are now noisier signals of
ones true type.
In our set-up, crowding out also occurs because of a noisier signal ef-
fect. However, social esteem depends on perceived behavior rather than the
perception of ones type. Furthermore, the extent of noise and the extent
to which formal incentives are used are endogenous: they reect adapta-
tive changes in the legal system. Thus, our contribution is not in providing
an understanding of the intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation puzzle per se.
Rather, we provide an instance of a social process whereby one set of incen-
tives crowds out another.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 2: By denition,
q(y; bx) = yFn(bx)
yFn(bx) + (1  y)Fh(bx)   y(1  Fn(bx))y(1  Fn(bx)) + (1  y)(1  Fh(bx)) :
The claim concerning changes in y follows trivially. To show the e¤ect of
changes in bx, observe that @q(y; bx)=@bx has the same sign as @q(y; bx)=@Fn(bx).
Noting that @Fh(bx)=@Fn(bx) = fh(bx)=fn(bx), we have
@q
@Fn
= y(1  y)

Fh   Fn(fh=fn)
(yFn + (1  y)Fh)2
  (1  Fn)(fh=fn)  (1  Fh)
(1  yFn   (1  y)Fh)2

:
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Write   yFn + (1   y)Fh for the proportion of individuals who escape
liability. Recalling that fn = fh at bxM , we get
@q
@Fn
bx=bxM = y(1  y)(Fn   Fh)

1
(1  )2  
1
2

: (9)
Since Fn > Fh, the sign of (9) is positive if the term in brackets is positive.
This requires  > 1=2, but by corollary 1 the latter holds for all bx  bxM .
Taking the second derivative,
@2q
@F 2n
= y(1  y)

1
(1  )2  
1
2

Fn
@(fh=fn)
@Fn
+2y(1  y) (y + (1  y)(fh=fn))

Fn(fh=fn)  Fh
3

+2y(1  y) (y + (1  y)(fh=fn))

(1  Fh)  (1  Fn)(fh=fn)
(1  )3

:
Consider the rst term. The expression in brackets is positive for all bx 
xM . Moreover, MLRP implies that fh=fn increases with Fn. Hence the rst
term is positive. Consider now the second term. It is positive if fh=fn >
Fh=Fn. Similarly, the third term is positive if (1   Fh)=(1   Fn) > fh=fn.
Both inequalities are well known to follow from MLRP. Hence, all terms
are positive, implying that q(y; bx) is convex in Fn(bx) for bx  xM . Since
@q=@Fn is positive at xM , it must therefore be positive at all bx  xM , thereby
completing the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4: Assuming 1   yssy > 0, the legal system is
stabilizing with respect to y if
(ys + ybxbxs)s

<
yss
1  yssy :
Expanding the determinant and simplifying, the condition reduces to
(ybx + yssbx)(bxs + bxyys) < 0
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where the second factor is positive. Similarly, the legal system is destabilizing
with respect to s if
(1  ybxbxy)s

>
s
1  yssy ;
which reduces to
(sbx + syybx)(bxs + bxyys) > 0:
Q.E.D.
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